Friday, October 26, 2012

Objectivism: The Uninspired Religion of "Reason"

By Michael David Rawlings

My philosophy, in essence, is the concept of man as a heroic being, with his own happiness as the moral purpose of his life, with productive achievement as his noblest activity, and reason as his only absolute. —Ayn Rand1
The politics of Rand's philosophy (called Objectivism for the postulate that all human knowledge may be objectively derived from reality via discovery rather than presupposition) calls for a minarchistic model of laissez-faire, an ideal arrangement of power whereby the state is not permitted to ameliorate the consequences of irresponsible behavior. Some critics on the left argue—due to their mindless reverence  for the politics of  bread and circuses—that Objectivism promotes rational anarchism (or anarcho-capitalism), despite the fact that it emphatically repudiates that model.

Government redistribution of wealth is a form of initial force (or coercion) that subsidizes and, consequently, encourages the sort of behavior that leads to poverty and dependency. It's the stuff of legalized theft exacted against the assets of individuals who aren't responsible for the circumstances, choices or failures of the recipients. In other words, beyond the general defense of the nation and the preservation of liberty and private property, including the necessary provisions and administrations thereof: it's immoral for the state to deprive a person of any portion of the fruits of his labor for the sake of persons who didn't earn them.

(Think President Barack You-Didn't-Build-That Obama.)

But upholding (1) the sanctity of human life (the Objectivist's contention that the unborn are not persons in any political sense notwithstanding) and (2) the official approbation of heterosexual marriage (and heterosexual marriage only due to the anatomical and biological realities of human sexuality and reproduction) are vital components of a tenably free society—whether it be a minarchism or something more akin to the original constitutional Republic of the United States. The body politic of a free society that fails to uphold these components will inevitably succumb to the whim-worshiping hedonism2 and collectivist tyrannies that Objectivists so passionately and rightly abhor (See "Abortion on Demand, Homosexual 'Marriage': what will they think of next?".). And the reason that most Objectivists fail to appreciate certain inevitabilities is because they arbitrarily disregard the most important axioms of them all, namely, Providence and the inescapable dynamics of the transcendent, moral imperatives exerted within the temporal realm that reward righteousness as they punish evil.

Man shall reap what he sows.

Hence, there's nothing new about the Objectivist's corollaries of reason and liberty, indolence and coercion or, inversely, the injustice and chaos of initial force and the restoration of justice and order with retaliatory force. Jews and Christians have been expounding on them for centuries. Classical liberalism's expositions on the necessities of liberty and the causes of tyranny are prolific (See "Classical Liberalism on the Corollary Dynamics of Morality and Liberty".).
Men are qualified for civil liberty in exact proportion to their disposition to put moral chains on their own appetites. Society cannot exist unless a controlling power upon will and appetite be placed somewhere, and the less of it there is within, the more there is without. It is ordained in the eternal constitution of things that men of intemperate minds cannot be free. Their passions forge their fetters. —Edmund Burke3

To be sure, liberty is the most effective safeguard against the ravages of widespread immorality, but most of today's Objectivists, like most libertarians, talk like politically correct leftists on a range of social issues. They naively believe that the impact of civil rights protections predicated on behavior in the name of social justice can be contained. In other words, they fan the flames of positive rights, which are obligatory in nature and necessarily entail the expansion of government in both the public and private sectors. This is very strange given the Objectivist's zeal for the prerogatives of laissez-faire.

So what's behind it?

For the Objectivist, religion and coercion are corollaries, so any perceived encroachments of theism on the hallowed ground of the political arena are anathema. It's this knee-jerk reactionism that causes the Objectivist to embrace the collectivist's agenda even when—or is it especially when?—the traditionalist exerts retaliatory force against it. Instead of joining the traditionalist in common cause for the sake of liberty, the Objectivist serves his own ideological interests first according to the ethics of his philosophy as he serves the interests of the collectivist contrary to the politics of his philosophy! Proof positive that selfishness as portrayed by rational egoism is not always wise or even empathetic in the sense that it remains open to "kindness, good will or respect for the rights of others . . . which," according to Rand, "altruism makes impossible."4

*crickets chirping*
Despite the often collectivist "gay rights" rhetoric that surrounds the issue, the trend toward permitting gay marriage is a positive step. —Objectivist thinker William R. Thomas5

Oh? And what is the agenda of the "collectivist 'gay rights' rhetoric"?

The same as that of the collectivist "war on women" rhetoric: the evisceration of the family, parental consent, property rights and free association.

The problem arises from a subtle contrivance in the premise of Objectivism's metaphysics. However, it's easier to start with its ethics and work backwards.

Rand merely begs the question when she assumes that self-sacrifice in the service of others necessarily precludes a healthy sense of self-interest or the possibility that one's self-interest (or happiness) could be fulfilled by a life of service to others. In response, no doubt, Rand would argue that my criticism merely circumvents the essence of her maxim, as "[t]he issue is whether the need of others is the first mortgage on your life and the moral purpose of your existence."6 But in fact, Rand obviates the essence of Christian love, which she conflates with the humanist tripe of Auguste Comte's ethical altruism: self-sacrifice as a moral obligation to live one's life for the sake of others, albeit, as directed, inevitably, by the state or the collective per Comte's "Religion of Humanity," a rather dour knockoff of Henri Saint-Simon's socialist utopianism.
The difference between Christian love and altruism . . . could be summarized as the difference between loving one's neighbor as oneself and loving one's neighbor instead of oneself.  —Thomas M. Dixon on the French philosopher Jacques Maritain's assessment of Comtean altruism7

But the God of Judeo-Christianity calls the redeemed out of the darkness of this world and ushers them into the light of truth; He frees them from the servitude and despair of sin.

The "first mortgage" on the life of the redeemed and "the moral purpose of his existence" is to have fellowship with God through Jesus Christ as one restored to one's rightful place of honor and dignity, as one profoundly served and loved by God first. The saint is called out of the world to take up his cross and follow Christ, to love and serve others as unto to God . . . not as unto his peers or the state, which is idolatry. In this he discovers the joy and fulfillment, the love and gratitude for which he was created.

By definition, the creature is obliged to love and honor his Creator; he is obliged to love and honor his fellow creatures. For everything that he is and everything that he has ultimately belongs to the Creator. There is no justification for the creature to throw off his obligations, that is, to violate God or the goodness of His moral precepts; to violate the life, the rights or the property of others . . . and then, on top of that, have the audacity to accuse God of committing the crime of initial force when, for the sake of His creation, He is compelled to confront evil with the retaliatory force of His justice. And yet, He mercifully provided a way out, devised an escape clause, one written in the blood of His very own suffering for whosoever will.

God raises the penitent from the dead unto life everlasting!

The Rands of this world wax poetic about the value of life and free will, about the joys and responsibilities thereof. They talk about liberty and the consequences of violating its terms. Then they inexplicably go on about the supposed coercion and irrationality of religion as rendered by Judeo-Christianity. But Judeo-Christianity isn't Comte's "Religion of Humanity." Nor is it anything like the other religions of this world that do make claims of transcendent origin.

While the Bible teaches that God is the undisputed proprietor of all that exists, the imposition of His will with regard to the common, everyday affairs of human life is not absolute, but conditional. Human societies are obliged to observe the imperatives of divine justice should they wish to live in relative peace and freedom, or they may disregard them and suffer the consequences, that is, live in terror, under the yoke of tyranny. Obviously, these are the extremes on either side of the spectrum in this imperfect world. The degree to which the body politic of any given society lives in accordance with the imperatives of divine justice is the degree to which it will enjoy life's blessings or suffer its maelstroms, respectively.

Only infants argue that a rational God would bestow free will on sentient creatures, but not weave a system of checks and balances into the fabric of creation against its misuses, as if the latter were not a loving and moral necessity. The God of the Bible does not demand that man serve Him as would a disposable bit of chattel; instead, He appeals to man's own best interests with love and mercy. God asks that man serve Him as would a beloved child that eagerly attends to its Father's call. In other words, we have chores to do and homework to complete. We are expected to grow and become something more all the time.

Under the God of the Bible, man is a partner in the governance of the universe; he's an honored steward of the talents, ambitions and wealth of this world, charged to enjoy and increase them for his own sake, for the sake of his family and friends, for the sake of the needy and downtrodden . . . for the sake of a lost world, for the sake heaven, for the sake of God. The zero-sum-gain mentality of the progressive yahoo doesn't aide here. The sociopolitical ramifications extrapolated from Judeo-Christianity's moral system of thought are not collectivism, authoritarianism, totalitarianism or even the trappings of theocracy. Their sociopolitical themes are limited government, freedom of conscience, freedom of speech, freedom of association, self-reliance, rugged individualism, accountability, self-determination, private property and so on. . . .

Rand was a Joanne-come-lately who remade the Founders in her own image for popular consumption throughout her career.
The Founding Fathers were neither passive, death-worshiping mystics nor mindless, power-seeking looters; as a political group, they were a phenomenon unprecedented in history: they were thinkers who were also men of action. They had rejected the soul-body dichotomy, with its two corollaries: the impotence of man's mind and the damnation of this earth; they had rejected the doctrine of suffering as man's metaphysical fate, they proclaimed man's right to the pursuit of happiness and were determined to establish on earth the conditions required for man's proper existence, by the unaided power of their intellect. —Ayn Rand8

Indeed, the Founders were not "passive, death-worshiping mystics" . . . but then, neither the mystics nor the Unitarians and Deists among them "rejected the soul-body dichotomy" or the idea of an afterlife, as Rand imagines. And they were not "mindless, power-seeking looters" like their counterparts in France, because, unlike those barbarians, they did not shun the ethical and political imperatives of Judeo-Christianity. Even that "Blackguard [Thomas] Paine",9 so-called by Adams, hoped for an afterlife.10 He even believed in a divine judgment: "it is the fool only, and not the philosopher, or even the prudent man, that would live as if there were no God",11 for "it is rational to believe that" God will hold us "to account for the manner in which we have lived here."12  While it's true that in this very same context he contests the validity of the biblical account of divine retribution, particularly as it pertains to this world and its inhabitants, Rand's belief that the obtuse assessments of men like Paine were typical, let alone historically or hermeneutically reliable, is absurd.

Christians simply do not see themselves and the world as the likes of Paine and Rand imagine.

Rand never was able to control her contempt for all things religious long enough to be teachably objective. Like Paine, she never rightly grasped the concept of redemption from the Christian perspective as it pertains to everyday life in this world, or the actual nature of the imago dei relative to the consequences of the Fall. Clearly, Rand was not well-versed in the theology of the Reformation or in the religious beliefs of the Founders as they pertained to their trepidation about the ever-threatening encroachments of government. In other words, "as a political group," the Founders did not countenance Rand's naïveté. Not for one second did they believe that the "unaided power" of even the most enlightened "intellect" was a sufficient safeguard against the foibles of human nature.
Of all the dispositions and habits, which lead to political prosperity, Religion and Morality are indispensable supports. In vain would that man claim the tribute of Patriotism, who should labor to subvert these great pillars of human happiness, these firmest props of the duties of Men and Citizens. The mere Politician, equally with the pious man, ought to respect and to cherish them. A volume could not trace all their connections with private and public felicity. Let it simply be asked, Where is the security for property, for reputation, for life, if the sense of religious obligation desert the oaths, which are the instruments of investigation in Courts of Justice? And let us with caution indulge the supposition, that morality can be maintained without religion. Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience both forbid us to expect, that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle. —George Washington13

Christianity did not suppress the human wisdom of the Western World for centuries as folks like Paine and Rand believe. It was a pretense of human wisdom incorporated by the state that suppressed the wisdom of Christianity for centuries . . . until the Reformation. Obscured for a season by the ecclesiastical trappings of the medieval Roman Catholic Church, the revealed religion of this theological revolution made the Enlightenment, the development of modern science and democratic theory, possible (See also "The 'New Math' of American History and the Unobscured Truth".).

Rand never satisfactorily explains why faith is the antithesis of reason. She merely likens it to blind devotion (strawman), something necessarily uninformed by rational or empirical evidence, as she brazenly asserts that the essence of existence and that of all real knowledge is strictly material. In other words, she begs the question and does so in spite of the axiomatic complexion of her metaphysics: the triadic construct of existence, identity and consciousness. The methodology of Rand's epistemology begins with the immediate perceptions of sensory input, the understanding of which are systematically refined via the processes of concept-formation, from the concrete to the abstract, including empirical validation and the application of inductive and deductive reasoning.

To her credit, insofar as it presents a false alternative, Rand sensibly rejects the rationalist-empiricist dichotomy of history, but nowhere in her letters does she demonstrate an awareness of the fact that the prophets and the apostles of the Bible rejected it's various renditions in history centuries before her! In the meantime, revelatory knowledge continuously guides our understanding of new information and does lend itself to the rigors of scientific and historical exegesis. Hence, one need not exhaustively expound Rand's philosophy in order to divulge the true impetus for her atheism. Instead, one need only wonder why she arbitrarily disdains the larger implications of her very own formulation for being.

The ramifications of Rand's notion that consciousness is relationally dependent in the sense that "it cannot be aware only of itself" as "there is no 'itself' until it is aware of something"14 other than itself allegedly overthrows the notion of an eternally existent, self-contained consciousness, for example, the Judeo-Christian concept of God as an eternally existent spirit of pure consciousness Who precedes the existence of all other entities, including that of the space-time continuum.  Hence, the consciousness to which Rand refers is finite, and the independent reality that she has in mind is physical, for in Rand's scheme of things the asseveration that existence has primacy over consciousness is absolute. Existence subsists on its own terms independently of consciousness. The limits of consciousness or the imperfections/incompleteness of its concepts at any given moment during the process of knowledge assimilation does not impinge upon the reality of the perceptions or that of the objects perceived, or as Rand's intellectual heir Leonard Peikoff puts it:
The fact that certain characteristics are, at a given time, unknown to man, does not indicate that these characteristics are excluded from the entity—or from the concept.15

A is A; existents are what they are, independent of the state of human knowledge; and a concept means the existents which it integrates. Thus, a concept subsumes and includes all the characteristics of its referents, known and not-yet-known.16
From there, Rand adroitly brings to bear the law of non-contradiction (A is B and A is not B are mutually exclusive) and conclusively establishes that concepts comprehensively encompass all of the pertinent attributes and referents of any given existent as distinguished from those of all other existents.   Though some would beg to differ, she thusly annihilates epistemological skepticism and Kantian subjectivism.
(Like Rand, I have no tolerance for the inscrutable, philosophical meanderings of doubt and indecision.)

While Rand's commonsensical approach to the metaphysics of physical being—that is, the idea that its existence has primacy over human consciousness—falls right in line with the Judeo-Christian worldview, it does not demonstrate that the space-time continuum exists independently of divine consciousness (or volition). For the idea of God—which contains within itself its own specific nature and attributes—imposes itself on the human mind without the human mind willing that it do so. In other words, the idea objectively exists in and of itself, and the atheist necessarily acknowledges this every time he denies there be any substance behind it. In Objectivist terms, that's what's known as an axiom, a reliably rational proposition, one that is worthy of serious consideration, even though it may not be true.
An axiom is a statement that identifies the base of knowledge and of any further statement pertaining to that knowledge, a statement necessarily contained in all others whether any particular speaker chooses to identify it or not. An axiom is a proposition that defeats its opponents by the fact that they have to accept it and use it in the process of any attempt to deny it. —Ayn Rand17

Rand's definition of axioms, explains Objectivist philosopher Leonard Peikoff, "is not a proof that the axioms of existence, consciousness, and identity are true. It is proof that they are axioms, that they are at the base of knowledge and thus inescapable."18

The key phrase here relative to Rand's triadic construct is "at the base of knowledge", as this is the standard established by Rand that arbitrarily precludes knowledge about or consideration of the transcendent. But sentience—a highly organized, intricately complex state of being—readily recognizes that it's something arguably greater than the independently existent, albeit, inanimate material around it. It also recognizes that a highly organized, intricately complex set of dynamics appear to govern the structural and mechanical interactions of the material around it. It also recognizes that the only entities that harbor the attributes of creation and design—above the level of the structural/mechanical, though apparently mindless formulations of nature—are sentient (See also "Abiogenesis: The Unholy Grail of Atheism".).

Let's not spend too much time here rehashing the impotency of the atheist's bland assertions in the face of the reductio ad absurdum of the irreducible mind or of the infinite regression of origin, as the atheist, whether he realizes it or not, necessarily acknowledges these imperatives in his denials. The idea of God is not a figment of human culture. It resides "at the base of knowledge", for the idea that something can arise from nothing (that existence can arise from nonexistence) is an inexplicable absurdity.
For those of you who believe in nothing and, therefore, are easily deceived by almost anything, atheistic scientists like Lawrence Krauss who intentionally muddle ontological distinctions, merely to get a rise out of the philosophers and theologians they detest, do a disservice to science. Whether in jest or not, it's irresponsible. They dishonor their profession and treat us all with contempt when they imply that the problem of existence is strictly a scientific matter. Atheists, whether they be accomplished scientists or not, are notoriously bad thinkers outside the comfort zone of their presumptuous metaphysics and are theologically illiterate bumpkins to boot. . . .  The vacuum of quantum mechanics is not an ontological nothingness and does not resolve the problem of an infinite regress of contingent entities. —Michael David Rawlings, "A Mountain of Nothin' from Somethin' or Another"

This impression comes to us immediately and all at once: either (1) the universe has always existed in some form or another, in some dimensional estate or another, or (2) it was caused to exist by a being who has always existed, a necessarily transcendent being of unlimited genius and power. In other words, the First Cause is either inanimate or sentient, immanent or transcendent.

That does not mean, however, that this objectively apparent impression constitutes a proof for either alternative. It demonstrates that it's at the base of knowledge, that it's derived from reason, not faith.

I have no interest in proving God's existence to anyone, just in demonstrating the absurdities that arise from the denial of the possibility, which, incidentally, do not plague the bald assertion that God must be whatsoever. The reason for this is self-evident: the idea of God pertains to the origin of the universe, not to its nonexistence, while the unqualified denial of God's existence detours around an inescapable imperative: the undeniable possibility. The former stems from larger considerations that do not interrupt the natural course of logic; the latter is akin to the blind devotion of religious fanaticism.

(Unlike Rand, I have no tolerance for the obtuse, philosophical evasions of atheism.)

While Rand's rejection of the rationalist-empiricist dichotomy as a false alternative is commonsensical, things get a bit confusing when she simultaneously argues that a priori knowledge is impossible.19 For if the senses provide the material of all knowledge, by what means does cognition provide the understanding of this material? It's one thing to argue that the actualities of existence are what they are regardless of what one might think about them. It's another thing to argue that these actualities may be assimilated by consciousness without an a priori structure of rational knowledge.

It's clear that due to the commonality of cerebral physiology a number of human experiences and behaviors are universal. The innate faculties of conceptual and mathematical logic, and language formation constitute the a priori structure of knowledge.  In other words, a number of a priori concepts are necessarily justified: the principle of identity, the principle of contradiction, the principle of excluded middle, the principle of causality, the concepts of quality and quantity, and so on. . . .

And while the object of perception and the form in which it is perceived are reality, albeit, relative to the open-ended, deductive-inductive process of concept-formation, it does not follow, as Rand contends, that the analytic-synthetic distinction is an irredeemably false dichotomy simply because the Kantian exegesis of it succumbs to subjectivism relative to the temporal realm of being.20  For the innate apprehension of this distinction is the impetus of concept-refinement; it's our awareness of it that compels us to develop an increasingly more perfect understanding of existence beyond the temporal realm of being.

In the final analysis, there's not much to recommend in Rand's rather sophomoric philosophy of the obvious. It's tenets rarely get beyond the trite, first principles of apprehension, and when they do, they run in the circles of tautology or down the path of unwitting self-negation. Let us just say that Objectivism's black-and-white think does not lend itself to linear logic or the practical necessities of extrapolation. Rand was a an idiot savant, and from personal experience, I've learned that her acolytes are stark raving mad.

Nevertheless, insofar as it's unwittingly informed by the imago dei of human consciousness, we may fairly conclude the following. . . .

Though incomplete with regard to the potentialities of being and a bit hazy with regard to the ultimate concerns of knowledge (justification/reliability), Rand's metaphysics and epistemology are reasonably conducive to the formulation of practical ideas and meaningful action . . . as long as they are not taxed beyond the mundane, everyday concerns of life (See also
"The Fuzz in Descartes' Belly Button".). Even though they be bottomed on nothing more substantial than the contingency of human reasoning, the virtues of her politics from the perspective of the classical liberal are self-evident. Though her apology for rational egoism confounds the distinction between ethical altruism and Christian love, it not only repudiates the confiscatory activities of "government charity," but also, despite the assumptions of many, the cheap thrills of hedonism and the fatuous malaise of nihilism. But then, on the other hand, sans the unassailable rebuttal of divine authority, her moral assessment of homosexuality, for example, based on the objectively apparent realities of nature's design, readily gives way to the subjective whims of "the new psychology," that is, collectivism's multiculturalism and political correctness.

As for her aesthetics, her passionate regard for the aspirations and heroism of romantic realism is commendable, as it aims for the stars and leaves the baggage of sentimental emotionalism behind. However, except for the sake of academic interests, I do not recommend her treatments of this aesthetic, as her works of fiction are almost unbearably didactic. Rand relies heavily on expositional dialogue to express her themes and neglects the power of fictive demonstration.

Her objective is "to make life more beautiful and interesting than it actually is, yet give it all the reality, and even a more convincing reality than that of our everyday existence."21 In this she fails miserably, as her take on the larger than life depiction of things "as [they] . . . could be and should be"22 yields a rather bland style of storytelling. It's the literal illustrations of common life, it's emotional and visceral realities, including the disgusting and unpleasant, its pratfalls and grotesqueries, the sublimities of life as revealed by its humor and horrors, underscored by the allegorical and anagogical aspects of the human experience, that animate good fiction.

1Ayn Rand, "About the Author", Atlas Shrugged; New York: Random House, pub. 1957 (35th Anniversary Edition, New York: Dutton, 1992); pp. 1170 - 1171. Print.

2Ayn Rand, The Virtue of Selfishness (Paperback Edition, New York: Signet Books, 1964), p. 18. Print.

3Edmund Burke, "Letter to a Member of the National Assembly", The Works of the Right Honorable Edmund Burke, pub. 1791 (Charleston, SC: Nabu Press, 2012), vol. 4. Print.

4Ayn Rand, "Faith and Force: Destroyers of the Modern World", Philosophy: Who Needs it, ed. Leonard Peikoff (New York: New American Library, 1982), p. 74. Print.

5William R. Thomas, "Gay Marriage", Web:
The Atlas Society: Objectivism in life and thought.

6Ibid., "Faith and Force: Destroyers of the Modern World", p. 74.

7Thomas M. Dixon, "Altruism", New Dictionary of the History of Ideas, Web: Encyclopedia.Com (2005); Jacques Maritain, Moral Philosophy: An Historical and Critical Survey of the Great Systems (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1964), Chapters 11, 12.

8Ayn Rand, For the New Intellectual: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand; New York: Random House, pub. 1961 (50th Anniversary Edition, New York: Penguin Publishing Company, 2011); p. 25. Print.

9John Adams, The Works of John Adams, Second President of the United States: with a Life of the Author, Notes and Illustrations, by his Grandson Charles Francis Adams; ed. Charles Francis Adams (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1856); vol. 3 (Autobiography, Diary, Notes of a Debate in the Senate, Essays), p. 421. Web: The Online Library of Liberty.

10Thomas Paine, The Age of Reason: Being an Investigation of True and Fabulous Theology; New York: Truth Seeker Co., pub. 1898 (Los Angeles, CA: Indo-European Publishing, 2010); Part I, p. 6.   Print.

11Ibid., Part II, p. 174

12Ibid., p. 173.

13"George Washington's Farwell Address" (1776). Web: Lillian Goldman Law Library of Yale Law School Online: The Avalon Project (2008).

14Allan Gotthelf, On Ayn Rand (Stamford, CT: Wadsworth Publishing-Cengage Learning, 2000). Print.

15Leonard Peikoff, "The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy", Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology (Ayn Rand), ed. Leonard Peikoff and Harry Binswanger (Expanded Second Edition, New York:  Meridian, 1990), pp. 94 - 95. Print.


17Ayn Rand, Atlas Shrugged; New York: Random House, pub. 1957 (35th Anniversary Edition, New York: Dutton, 1992); p. 1040. Print.

18Leonard Peikoff, Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand (New York: Dutton, 1991), p. 11. Print.

19Ibid. Leonard Peikoff, "The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy", pp. 116-118.

20Ibid., p. 94.

21Ayn Rand, Letters of Ayn Rand, ed. Michael S. Berliner (New York: Dutton, 1995), pp. 242 - 243. Print.

22Ibid., p. 243.

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